The Endogeneity of Miscalibration: Impossibility and Escape in Scored Reporting
4.00T1 sourcearXiv cs.MA
Source record
Published by arXiv cs.MA (T1 source). The original is at https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.07671.
Pipeline notes
The summary and note below are generated by the signal pipeline — they are Beyond Desk’s reading, not quotations from the source.
SummaryThe paper shows that strictly proper probability scores conflict with non-affine approval rules, making truthful reporting endogenous. It derives a reserve-report threshold and a critical-slope condition under which approval can sort agents as if beliefs were observed, including closed forms for Brier, log, and power scores, and applies the analysis to AI-agent oversight.
Why it mattersProvides explicit design constraints for agent-report approval mechanisms, with testable incentive-compatibility thresholds and tractable formulas for common scores.
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